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Abstract:  We evaluate causal impacts of prenatal WIC participation on healthy birth outcomes, 
simultaneously accounting for self-selection of expectant mothers into WIC and systematic 
underreporting of program participation.  In doing so, we extend existing partial identification methods to 
reflect the institutional details of the program.  In particular, we allow for a richer measurement error 
model and apply a modified regression discontinuity design.  Combining survey data from the Early 
Childhood Longitudinal Study Birth Cohort (ECLS-B) with administrative data from the USDA, our 
preferred estimates imply that WIC reduces the prevalence of unhealthy birth weight by at least 21 
percent and unhealthy gestation duration by at least 9.9 percent.   
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1.  Introduction   
The Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) is an early 
intervention program that provides benefits to about nine million recipients per year, nearly a million 
of whom are pregnant women (Johnson et al., 2013).  In 2016, 39.6% of women who gave birth in 
the U.S. received prenatal benefits from WIC (Driscoll and Osterman, 2018). By providing access to 
nutritious food supplements, education, and preventative health services, the prenatal program aims 
to improve fetal development and reduce the incidence of low birth weight and short gestation 
(USDA, 2003; Johnson et al., 2013).1  In general, a large body of research finds that WIC recipients 
are much less likely (10%‒40%) to have low birth weight babies than non-WIC recipients (see 
Currie, 2003; Bitler and Currie, 2005; Hoynes et al., 2011; Rossin-Slater, 2013; Currie and Rajani, 
2015).  
While participating in WIC might improve fetal development, drawing credible inferences is 
complicated by two fundamental identification problems: unknown counterfactual birth outcomes for 
infants and underreported WIC participation of mothers.  A selection problem arises because the data 
alone cannot reveal what the birth outcome of an infant whose mother participated in WIC would 
have been had she not participated, or vice versa.  A measurement error problem arises because 
households are known to systematically underreport the receipt of food assistance in national 
surveys. 
In this paper, we evaluate the effects of prenatal WIC participation on the probability of 
normal birth weight (between 2500 grams and 4000 grams), full term pregnancy (gestation age 
between 38 and 42 weeks), and other related birth outcomes, accounting for both the selection and 
                                                 
1 WIC has more specific nutritional and health related objectives than the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP).  While the WIC food package for pregnant women has a small dollar value (an average of about 
$40/month in 2015), it provides specific nutrients that are known to benefit fetal development.  Moreover, unlike 
SNAP, WIC benefits are not limited to food.  WIC also provides nutrition education and counseling, preventive 
health care, and social services – either on-site or through referrals to other agencies (Johnson et al., 2013).  For 
example, at-risk women can receive special health care including enrollment in smoking cessation programs (Bitler 
and Currie, 2005). 
2 
measurement problems.  Our analysis complements the recent literature by simultaneously 
addressing the measurement and selection problems.  Although more recent studies have addressed 
the self-selection problem by applying instrumental variable models (e.g., Bitler and Currie, 2005; 
Figlio et al., 2009; Hoynes et al., 2011; Currie and Rajani, 2015) and maternal fixed effects models 
(e.g., Rossin-Slater, 2015; Currie and Rajani, 2015), all previous studies evaluating the impact of a 
mother’s decision to enroll in prenatal WIC on birth outcomes treat indicators of WIC participation 
as accurate.2  Even if the endogenous selection problem is credibly addressed, evaluating the efficacy 
of WIC is further complicated by a nonclassical measurement error problem in participation status.  
Households are known to systematically underreport the receipt of food assistance in national 
surveys, and reporting errors may be related to both birth outcomes and socioeconomic 
characteristics (e.g., Bollinger and David, 1997; Bitler et al., 2003; Meyer et al., 2009)3  Even small 
amounts of nonclassical measurement error in a treatment variable can be sufficient to overturn 
conclusions obtained under an implicit assumption of accurately measured treatments.4 
The combination of these dual identification problems poses a particular challenge for 
estimating treatment effects that cannot be overcome by applying standard IV techniques.  Such 
methods are known to lead to inconsistent estimates when an endogenous binary treatment variable is 
measured with error (e.g., Black et al., 2000; Frazis and Loewenstein, 2003).  Even supposing the 
treatment is perfectly measured, it is difficult in this literature to find instruments that are both valid 
                                                 
2 Kreider et. al. (2016) allow for WIC receipt to be misclassified in their analysis of the impact of WIC on food 
security, but they do not study birth outcomes. They also use a less flexible measurement error model, and the 
methods do not exploit information on adjunctive eligibility into WIC.   
3 The classical measurement error attenuation result does not necessarily hold in this nonclassical environment.  
Instead, estimated treatment effects may be either underestimated or overestimated depending on application-
specific unobserved patterns of classification errors.   
4 In a regression framework with nonclassical measurement error, Kreider (2010) finds that just a 1.3 percent error 
rate in reported health insurance status is sufficient to generate a double-digit percentage point range of uncertainty 
about the variable’s true marginal impact on the use of health services.  Millimet (2011) reinforces this finding for a 
broader class of treatment effect models. 
3 
and strong.5  Beyond the weak instruments problem, variation in policy instruments across states (for 
example) that affect WIC participation rates may be endogenously related to birth outcomes. These 
policies are not randomly assigned, and policies targeted towards more WIC participation (e.g., 
relatively easy recertification) may be correlated with other state policies designed to improve 
income or health, which may themselves affect an expectant mother’s birth outcome. 
A number of recent studies have applied creative and credible identification strategies to 
address the selection problem.  For example, Figlio et al. (2009) focus on families in a narrow 
income range surrounding the WIC income eligibility threshold, comparing birth outcomes of 
women in Florida who are marginally eligible and marginally ineligible for WIC.  Exploiting a 
policy change involving the tightening of income documentation requirements, they find that WIC 
participation substantially reduces the likelihood of adverse birth outcomes, despite having little 
effect on mean outcomes.  Hoynes et al. (2011) evaluate the performance of WIC on infant health at 
the time of its establishment as a pilot program in 1972, exploiting the plausibly exogenous county-
level variation in participation due to the staggered rollout of the program in the 1970s.  Their 
analysis provides evidence that WIC initiation led to improved birthweights during that era, 
especially for mothers with less education.   Rossin-Slater (2013) builds on their approach by 
exploiting a finer variation in WIC clinic access within zip codes and by employing a maternal fixed 
effects instrumental variable strategy.  Her results show that prenatal access to WIC clinics within a 
mother’s zip code of residence leads to a 0.8% increase in average birth weight.  While these latter 
two studies provide important new insights and evidence about the role of local access to WIC in 
improving birth outcomes, they do not use direct information about a particular mother’s WIC 
participation status.  
                                                 
5 As highlighted by Hoynes et al. (2011) and others, food assistance programs like SNAP and WIC exhibit relatively 
little geographic variation in benefit rules to be leveraged compared with other programs targeted to disadvantaged 
households, such as TANF and Medicaid.   
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Using data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study-Birth cohort of 2001 (ECLS-B) and 
auxiliary information from USDA administrative files, we simultaneously address the measurement 
and endogenous selection identification problems by extending the nonparametric bounding strategy 
in Kreider, Pepper, Gundersen, and Jolliffe (2012, hereafter KPGJ) to reflect the institutional details 
of WIC.  This framework does not require traditional instrumental variable or classical measurement 
error assumptions, or a linear response model.6  Instead, we rely on a number of monotonicity 
restrictions that are relatively weak compared with the strict orthogonality assumptions embedded in 
standard IV or classical measurement error models.   
After describing the data in Section 2, we formalize the empirical question and the 
identification problems in Section 3.  Then, in Section 4, we derive bounds on average treatment 
effects (ATE) for a reference case that the decision to take up WIC is exogenous but allowing for 
mismeasured WIC participation.  Though the exogenous selection assumption is unlikely to hold in 
our setting, the difference in expected outcomes among WIC recipients and nonrecipients – the mean 
outcome gap – is a parameter reported in much of the existing literature (see Currie, 2003) and is an 
important descriptive measure of the association between WIC participation and birth outcomes.   
In Section 5, we turn our attention to drawing inferences on the ATE given the endogenous 
selection problem.  We consider the identifying power of several types of monotone instrumental 
variables (MIV) (Manski and Pepper, 2000) in which we posit monotonic relationships between the 
latent probabilities of healthy birth outcomes and certain observed covariates, such as household 
income.  We also extend a modified discontinuity design (see Gundersen et al., 2012) to account for 
WIC eligibility rules that confer adjunctive eligibility through participation in other assistance 
programs.  Finally, we consider the identifying power of a monotone treatment response (MTR) 
assumption that WIC does not harm expected birth outcomes on average (Manski, 1997). 
                                                 
6 The classical linear response model is not compatible with government programs thought to have heterogeneous 
impacts across households (Moffitt, 2005). 
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Combining endogenous selection with measurement error naturally weakens what we can 
conclude about the average treatment effects.  Nevertheless, we can still identify beneficial impacts 
of WIC on healthy birth outcomes under relatively mild assumptions that explicitly account for 
selection and underreported participation.  Section 6 concludes.  
2.  Data 
To study the impact of WIC on birth outcomes, we use data from the first wave of the Early 
Childhood Longitudinal Study, Birth Cohort (ECLS-B), a nationally representative cohort of 10,700 
children born in 2001.7  Assembled by the U.S. Department of Education, the ECLS-B is particularly 
useful for this study since it focuses on children’s early environmental characteristics, including 
those in the prenatal period, that are thought to play a crucial role in development.  The first wave of 
the survey collects information from the child’s mother between Fall 2001 and Fall 2002 when the 
child is approximately 9 months old.  
Our analysis focuses on 4,750 households included in the first wave of the ECLS-B.8  This 
sample reflects two notable restrictions.9  First, the sample is restricted to infants who are singletons 
(e.g., not twins).  Second, we focus on households that appear to be eligible for prenatal WIC 
benefits, either through income eligibility or adjunctive eligibility.10  To be income eligible, family 
gross income cannot exceed 185 percent of the U.S. Poverty Income Guidelines ($32,653 in 2001 for 
a family of four).  Irrespective of income, families are adjunctively (automatically) eligible for WIC 
if they participate in Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), or 
                                                 
7 ECLS-B case-level data are available to researchers who request and obtain a restricted-use data license.  
Information about receiving a restricted-use data license can be found at http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/licenses.asp.  
Information about the survey design can be found at https://nces.ed.gov/ecls/birth.asp. 
8 All sample sizes are rounded to the nearest 50 per National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) restricted data 
regulations for the ECLS-B. 
9 We also drop about 400 observations that had missing information on age. 
10 Recipients must also be at nutritional risk, as determined by a physician, nutritionist, or nurse.  In practice, nearly 
all income-eligible households satisfy at least one of the nutritional risk criteria (Ver Ploeg and Betson, 2003; 
Currie, 2003, p. 215). 
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Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).  The ECLS-B does not ask about prenatal 
participation in SNAP or TANF (only about postpartum participation), but it does ask about prenatal 
Medicaid benefits.  Our sample therefore consists of households that either met the 185 percent 
income threshold or reported the receipt of prenatal Medicaid.  Nearly all SNAP and TANF 
households met the income eligibility criterion (Jacknowitz and Tiehen, 2010), and thus are already 
included in the income-eligible sample.11  
 Measurement error may lead to some contamination of our eligibility indicator (see 
Gundersen et al., 2012, and Jacknowitz and Tiehen, 2010).  In addition to standard problems in 
accurately measuring income in self-reported surveys, there may be a mismatch between the income 
measures reported in the ECLS-B and those used to determine eligibility during the prenatal period.  
The ECLS-B survey collects information on annual income at the time of the “9-month” survey, thus 
covering parts of both the prenatal and postnatal periods.  True income-eligibility, however, is 
determined only in the prenatal period and, depending on particular policies of the state WIC 
agencies, might be based on a monthly rather than annual income measure.  This mismatch between 
the survey reporting periods and the programmatic rules is a common problem in evaluating 
eligibility for assistance programs using survey data and, in the case of WIC, has been found to 
understate the number of eligible households (Ver Ploeg and Betson, 2003).  
Still, regardless of the potential for errors in classifying eligibility, this sample restriction 
generates a well-defined subpopulation of interest – namely singleton infants residing in households 
that report income less than 185 percent of the poverty line and/or the receipt of Medicaid.  We have 
checked the sensitivity of our results to different income thresholds and find that our qualitative 
                                                 
11 According to records assembled by the USDA, about two-thirds of WIC recipients reported participating in at 
least one public assistance program conferring adjunctive eligibility in 2002 (USDA, 2003, Exhibit 4.3) but only 1.7 
percent of prenatal participants reported income of more than 185 percent of the poverty line (USDA, 2003, Exhibit 
4.7).  Another 16.5 percent recipients did not report income.  
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conclusions are robust to income thresholds ranging from 150% to 200% of the poverty line and to 
the exclusion of Medicaid recipients.  
Finally, applying a modified regression discontinuity design similar to the one in Gundersen 
et al. (2012) and Schanzenbach (2009), we also use data on a subsample of infants residing in 
households with incomes above the income threshold but below the fourth quintile of the 
socioeconomic status (SES) distribution (N=1,250).  We constrain this subsample to include only 
households that appear to be ineligible for WIC because their incomes are too high and they are not 
adjunctively eligible through other programs.   
2.1. Birth outcomes 
Table 1 displays means and standard deviations for the variables used in our analysis for the 
main sample of infants whose mothers were eligible to receive prenatal WIC (N=4,750).12  The last 
two columns report differences in means between those reporting prenatal WIC receipt and those 
classified as eligible nonparticipants. We refer to this difference as the expected outcome gap based 
on self-reports of participation. In Section 3, we examine the implications of classification error for 
drawing inferences on the true mean outcome gap.  
We observe a number of different outcome measures of infant health related to birth weight 
and gestation age.  We focus mostly on indicators of normal birth weight (between 2500 grams and 
4000 grams) and normal gestation length (between 38 and 42 weeks).  Descriptive statistics in Table 
1 reveal that infants whose parents report having received prenatal WIC have slightly better birth 
weight outcomes on average but worse gestation length outcomes than eligible nonparticipants.13  
For example, the gap in the probability of a normal birth weight is 1.95 percentage points while the 
gap in the probability of a normal gestation length is -1.00 percentage point.  We also evaluate other 
                                                 
12 All analyses are performed using survey weights available in the ECLS-B. 
13 Similar qualitative associations are reported in Bitler and Currie (2005).  
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measures of favorable birth outcomes including birth weight of at least 1500 grams (not very low 
birth weight), at least 2500 grams (not low birth weight), no more than 4000 grams (not 
macrosomic), and indicators for near-term pregnancy – gestation age of at least 33 weeks (not very 
premature) or at least 37 weeks (not premature).  
A large literature documents the importance of early health outcomes, even as early as in 
utero, in influencing future adult outcomes (see Almond, 2006).  That birth weight and gestation 
length affect future outcomes has been widely documented.  Breslau et al. (1994), Brooks-Gunn et al. 
(1996), and Currie and Hyson (1999), for example, link birth weight to average scores on several 
different tests of intellectual and social development.  Goldenberg and Cullhane (2007) find that low 
birth weight is strongly associated with later adult chronic medical conditions like diabetes, 
hypertension, and heart disease.  Boulet et al. (2004) find that macrosomia is related to fetal injury, 
perinatal asphyxia, and fetal death, as well as complications for the mother like increasing the 
probability of caesarean delivery.  Using birth weight, gestation age, and Apgar score as metrics for 
infant health, Oreopoulos et al. (2008) conclude that poor infant health is a predictor of mortality 
within one year as well as mortality until age 17.14   
Boyle and Boyle (2013) review and summarize the current available literature on infants born 
at moderate preterm (32-33 weeks) and late preterm (34-36 weeks) gestations and conclude that 
preterm infants face significantly greater risks of morbidity and mortality than previously believed.  
Goldenberg et al. (2008) also identify preterm birth as the leading cause of perinatal morbidity and 
mortality in developed countries.  For even longer term outcomes, Crump et al. (2011) find that 
shorter gestation is most significantly associated with increased mortality in early childhood and 
mortality related to congenital anomalies and respiratory, endocrine, and cardiovascular disorders in 
young adults.  Morse et al. (2009) report a positive association between preterm birth and risks of 
                                                 
14 Other studies exploiting sibling comparisons include Conley and Bennett (2000), Johnson and Schoeni (2007), 
Lawlor et al. (2006), Black et al. (2007), Royer (2009), and Currie and Moretti (2007). 
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developmental delay and school-related problems such as risk of suspension and disability in 
prekindergarten at age three and four, among others. 
2.2. WIC participation indicator and misclassification 
For each household, we observe a self-reported indicator of prenatal participation in WIC.  
This binary treatment variable takes a value of one if the mother reports receiving WIC benefits 
during pregnancy, and zero otherwise.  In the survey, 69.2 percent of the classified eligible 
households report prenatal WIC receipt.  This self-reported participation rate is similar to those found 
in other surveys (e.g., the CPS and SIPP) but lower than analogous rates found using administrative 
data (Bitler et al., 2003; USDA, 2009).  Bitler et al. (2003) and Meyer et al. (2009) find evidence of 
substantial underreporting of WIC participation in the CPS, SIPP, and PSID.  
Direct evidence on the extent of classification errors in the ECLS-B can be found using 
administrative data from the USDA.  In particular, the USDA (2009) estimates that there were about 
1.2 million pregnant women who were eligible for prenatal WIC benefits in 2000, while the 
administrative records revealed about 0.89 million participants in the prenatal program (USDA, 
2003).  These values imply an estimated true participation rate of about 0.74, which is higher than the 
self-reported rate of 0.692.15  Hausman et al.’s (1998) parametric model of asymmetric 
misclassification provides an alternative approach for estimating the extent of misreporting.  
                                                 
15 The USDA (2009) reports estimates of the participation rate (which they label the coverage rate) to be 0.67 in 
2000 and 0.64 in 2001.  However, these estimated participation rates do not directly apply in our analysis due to 
mismatches between the survey and administrative data.  Most notably, the USDA rates are based on the average 
number of monthly participants (0.841 in 2000) whereas the ECLS-B measures any participation during pregnancy. 
Thus, rather than using monthly averages, we use data on the total number of participants.  Even with this 
adjustment, however, there are number of reasons why the participation rates estimated using the USDA reports may 
be inconsistent with the measures derived using data from the ECLS-B.  First, the numerator may be biased due to 
mismatches in the timing of the survey and administrative data (mothers whose children were born in 2001 versus 
calendar year).  Second, the estimated number of eligible households may be biased because of timing differences 
(see above), of errors in measuring adjunctive and income eligibility, of differences in the surveys (the USDA uses 
the Current Population Survey), and the USDA uses a monthly rather than annual income measure.  We do not 
directly address these latter measurement issues when using administrative data to estimate the true participation 
rate.  Instead, we trace out the sensitivity of inferences to the true participation rate.  
10 
Estimates using this approach imply a true participation rate of 0.84, with fewer than 1 percent of the 
eligible population falsely reporting WIC participation (see Section 4.1, footnote 18 for additional 
details).  Thus, consistent with the related SNAP literature, estimates from this model suggest large 
degrees of underreporting of WIC participation in the ECLS-B but negligible rates of false positive 
reporting.   
Some have raised concerns that using a simple indicator of receipt may lead to a mechanical 
upward bias in the traditional estimates of the effect of WIC on birth outcomes that do not account 
for the timing of take-up (i.e., a gestational age bias) (see Ludwig and Miller, 2005; Joyce et al., 
2005; and Rossin-Slater, 2013).  Women whose pregnancies last longer have a longer period to use 
prenatal WIC benefits.  While the ECLS-B does not provide information on prenatal WIC benefits, it 
does ask respondents to report on the take-up trimester.  With these data, the methods developed in 
this paper could be extended to assess whether the timing of take-up has a distinct impact (see 
Pepper, 2000).  Nevertheless, we do not explicitly model the duration of prenatal WIC benefits.  Our 
partial identification models allow the timing of take-up to be heterogeneous and, as such, do not 
result in biased estimates of the bounds on the ATEs of WIC on birth outcomes.  Moreover, with less 
than 10% of prenatal recipients taking up WIC in the last trimester (USDA, 2003, Exhibit 3.2), 
adding multidimensional treatments would result in more ambiguity arising from the selection 
problem, and classification error problems would be compounded and more difficult to credibly 
address.  
3.  Identifying the causal effect of WIC on infant health 
Our interest is in learning about average treatment effects (ATE) of prenatal maternal WIC 
participation on infant health among eligible households.16  For binary outcomes, these average 
                                                 
16 Section 3 closely follows KPGJ’s foundation for discussing partial identification of average treatment effects.  
Subsequent sections extend these methods to introduce partial verification of treatment status, a potentially 
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treatment effects can be expressed as 
             
(1,0 | ) [ (1) | ] [ (0) | ]
                            [ (1) 1| ] [ (0) 1| ]                                  (1)
ATE X E H X E H X
P H X P H X
∈ Ω = ∈ Ω − ∈ Ω
= = ∈ Ω − = ∈ Ω
  
where H is the realized health outcome, H(1) denotes the infant’s health if he or she were to receive 
WIC, H(0) denotes the analogous outcome if the infant were not to receive WIC, and X ∈ Ω denotes 
conditioning on observed covariates whose values lie in the set Ω.  Thus, the average treatment effect 
reveals the mean health effect of prenatal WIC participation (compared with nonparticipation) for a 
WIC eligible household chosen randomly from the underlying population.  In what follows, we will 
simplify notation by suppressing the conditioning on subpopulations of interest captured in X.  For 
this analysis, we focus on infants who appear to be eligible for prenatal WIC based on sufficiently 
low household income or through the receipt of Medicaid.   
 Two identification problems arise when assessing the impact of WIC on infant health.  First, 
even if WIC participation were observed for all eligible households, the potential outcome (1)H  is 
counterfactual for all infants who did not receive WIC, while (0)H  is counterfactual for all infants 
who did receive WIC.  This is referred to as the selection problem.  Second, true participation status 
may not be observed for all respondents.  This is referred to as the measurement or classification 
error problem.  Instead of observing W*, we observe a self-reported indicator, W, where W = 1 if an 
infant resides in a household that reported receiving prenatal WIC and 0 otherwise.  Without 
assumptions restricting the nature or degree of classification errors, the sampling process does not 
reveal useful information on WIC receipt, W*.   
 To address these two identification problems, we proceed in two steps.  First, we focus on the 
implications of the measurement error problem alone when we have information on the true 
                                                                                                                                                             
mismeasured monotone instrument, a formal analysis of the exogenous selection assumption, and parallel sets of 
bounds for the case that the researcher does not have auxiliary information about the true participation rate.   
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participation rate, P*, and the self-reported rate, P.  Second, we assess what can be inferred when 
accounting for both the selection and measurement problems simultaneously.   
4.  Bounds under exogenous selection with classification errors 
Until recently, the literature examining the impact of WIC on health assumed that selection is 
(conditionally) exogenous so that *[ ( ) | ] [ ( )], 1,0.P H j W P H j j= =  Under this assumption, the 
average treatment effect can be written as  
   * *(1,0 | ) [ (1) 1| 1] [ (0) 1| 0],ATE X P H W P H W∈ Ω = = = − = =   
which in turn can be expressed as the difference in conditional means:  
* *                           ( 1 | 1) ( 1| 0).                                   (2)P H W P H Wβ ≡ = = − = =         
The appeal of the exogenous selection assumption is obvious: if selection is exogenous and WIC 
receipt W* is observed, then the average treatment effect is identified by the sampling process.   
 Though the exogenous selection assumption is unlikely to hold in our setting, the difference 
in expected outcomes among WIC recipients and nonrecipients – the mean outcome gap, β  – is an 
important descriptive measure of the association between WIC participation and birth outcomes.  The 
sample means displayed in Table 1, for example, suggest that WIC is associated with a slightly 
higher probability of a normal birth weight but lower probability of a normal gestation age.   
4.1  Classification error model 
 If one allows for the possibility of classification errors in  *,W  the mean outcome gap in 
Equation (1) is not identified.  To address the classification error problem, we combine auxiliary data 
on the size of the caseload from the USDA with survey data from the ECLS-B to estimate the true 
and self-reported participation rates, * *( 1)P P W= =  and ( 1).P P W= =   Following KPGJ, the 
auxiliary information identifies the difference in false negative and positive reporting rates: 
* .P P∆ = −    
13 
 As noted above, the USDA data reveal that P* = 0.74 and the self-reported rate reported in 
the ECLS-B is P = 0.692.  Thus, in our application, ∆ is estimated to equal 0.048 ( 0.74 0.692)= − .  
The fraction of false negative reports must exceed the fraction of false positive reports by this 
quantity.  Given the potential mismatch between the survey and administrative reports on eligibility 
and participation (see above), we will also explicitly allow for the possibility that the estimated true 
participation rate of 0.74 may be in error by tracing out the sensitivity of inferences to variation in 
this rate.   
We apply two additional restrictions on the classification error problem:  
ME1:  Maximum error rate:      *( ) uP W W Q≠ ≤         (3) 
ME2:   Verification:        *1V W W= ⇒ =        (4) 
where Qu is a known upper bound on the degree of data corruption (see Horowitz and Manski, 1995) 
and V is an observed indicator of whether a self-report of WIC participation is known to be accurate.   
For Assumption ME1 considered in KPGJ, the upper bound error rate Qu must logically lie 
within the range [| |, 1].∆   In the polar case that Qu equals 1, ME1 is uninformative.  We refer to this  
case as the “arbitrary errors model.”  In the other polar case that Qu equals | |,∆  the researcher is 
imposing a “no excess errors” assumption.  In the case of net underreporting ( 0∆ > ), for example, 
this assumption is equivalent to imposing a “no false positives” assumption that respondents do not 
falsely claim to participate in WIC.  This no excess errors restriction serves as a useful benchmark 
for the receipt of WIC.  Validation data suggest very few instances of households falsely claiming to 
receive food assistance (e.g., Bollinger and David 1997).17  Moreover, using a parametric 
measurement error model formalized by Hausman et al. (1998), we estimate that less than one 
                                                 
17 An exception is Kirlin and Wiseman (2014) who, examining WIC cases in Texas, find evidence of net 
underreporting but substantial over-reporting as well.  In this case, the arbitrary errors assumption is appropriate. 
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percent of the income-eligible WIC population incorrectly reports receiving benefits.18  Middle-
ground positions are obtained by setting Qu between *| |P P−  and 1.   
Assumption ME2 extends KPGJ by allowing a researcher to formally verify the accuracy of 
some mixture of positive and negative WIC responses.  Verified responses are denoted 1V = .  When
0V = , a report may be either accurate or inaccurate.  In the no false positives model, for example, 
respondents reporting the receipt of WIC are validated to provide accurate reports.  Such respondents 
have revealed their willingness to report the receipt of WIC benefits despite any potential stigma.  
We also consider stronger verification that treats a response as accurate if the household is willing to 
report the receipt of benefits from any related program asked about in the ECLS-B (WIC, SNAP, 
TANF, or Medicaid).  Such households have revealed their general willingness to report benefits, 
even if they did not specifically report WIC benefits.  Under this verification assumption, 84 percent 
of the WIC responses are treated as accurate.  In the traditional literature, all WIC responses are 
implicitly treated as accurate.  
In Appendix A1, we derive closed-form analytical bounds on the outcome gap, β , as 
Proposition 1.  The bounds take a particularly simple form for the arbitrary errors case (Qu = 1), 
which we present as Corollary 1:   
Corollary 1  The outcome gap, ,β  under arbitrary errors is bounded sharply as follows: 
        * * * *
( 1) 1 ( 1) ( 1) 1 ( 1)min , min , .
1 1
P H P H P H P H
P P P P
β= − = = − =   − ≤ ≤   
− −   
 
To estimate these bounds, all we require is an estimate of ( 1)P H = , the fraction of healthy birth 
outcomes, and an estimate of *,P  the true WIC participation rate.  The fraction of healthy birth 
                                                 
18 Using Hausman et al.’s (1998) model, the true participation rate is specified as * ( ' ),P F X γ=  where F(∙) is the 
standard normal CDF and is a vector of covariates.  Given data on the self-reported rate, ( 1),P P W= =  the model 
identifies the conditional false negative reporting rate, *( 0 | 1),P W W= =  and the conditional false positive reporting 
rate, *( 1 | 0).P W W= =   We estimate these rates to be 0.19 and 0.05, respectively.  Based on these estimates, we are 
able to back out an estimate of *P  and the unconditional misreporting rates using 
* * * *[ ( 1 | 0)] / [1 ( 1 | 0) ( 0 | 1)].P P P W W P W W P W W= − = = − = = − = =   Our estimate of the false negative rate is 
0.159, and our estimate of false positive rate  is 0.008.  Full estimation results are available from the authors. 
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outcomes is consistently estimated using data from the ECLS-B. We estimate * 0.74P =  using 
administrative data on the size of the WIC caseload as described above, but we also assess the 
sensitivity of the bounds to variation in P*.  Appendix A1 also provides parallel sets of bounds for the 
case that the researcher has no auxiliary information about the value of P*. 
4.2.  Results under exogenous selection  
Figure 1 traces out the estimated Proposition 1 bounds on the outcome gap for normal birth 
weight as the true participation rate P* varies between 0 and 1 under (a) arbitrary classification errors 
(no verification), (b) no false positive reports of WIC receipt, and (c) verified WIC status responses 
for households that report benefits from any government program.  The accompanying table beneath 
the figure displays the bounds at the self-reported participation rate, * 0.692,P P= =  and the true 
participation rate, * 0.74,oP P= =  along with Imbens-Manski (2004) confidence intervals.  Strictly 
positive estimated average treatment effects are highlighted in bold.  
If all WIC responses are known to be accurate, the mean outcome gap is point-identified at  
*P P=  as 0.854 – 0.835 0.0195β = = , consistent with the descriptive statistic in the second row of 
Table 1.  Otherwise, the difference in mean outcomes can only be partially identified.  If nothing is 
known about the accuracy of individual responses, the figure reveals that little can be inferred about 
the true health outcome gap even if the researcher has knowledge that WIC respondents do not 
systematically over- or underreport benefits (no net misreporting).  Specifically, the true value of β   
at *P P=  under arbitrary errors could lie anywhere within [ 0.219,0.494]− , a 71 percentage point 
range of uncertainty even prior to accounting for sampling variability.  These arbitrary errors bounds 
expand to  [ 0.205,0.584]−  at the estimated true participation rate *P  = 0.74. 
Partial verification narrows these bounds to [ 0.205,0.0592]−  under no false positives (a two-
thirds reduction in the width of the bounds) and further to [ 0.0759,0.0592]−  when responses are 
treated as accurate if the household reported any government benefits (an 82% reduction in the 
width).  Graphically, the small trapezoid-like region in Figure 1 (dotted region) highlights the 
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methodological contribution of verification assumption ME2 in Equation (4).  A practitioner’s ability 
to formally verify some mixture of positive and negative participation responses can dramatically 
reduce the identification region.   
Still, without further assumptions, identification of the birth outcome gap deteriorates 
sufficiently rapidly that small degrees of WIC classification error preclude us from identifying the 
sign of this gap.  The conclusion that normal birth outcomes are more (or less) prevalent among WIC 
recipients than among eligible nonrecipients requires a large degree of confidence in self-reported 
WIC participation status, an assumption not supported by validation studies.  Results are similar for 
the other birth outcomes.  For example, analogous bounds for normal gestation duration (not shown) 
at *P  = 0.74 range from [ 0.335,0.953]−  under arbitrary errors to [ 0.202,0.0518]−  under no false 
positives to [ 0.112,0.0518]−  under stronger verification.19  Thus, with even small amounts of 
classification error, the results from the earlier empirical literature evaluating the impact of WIC on 
birth weight appear tenuous. 
5.  Bounds with selection and classification error problems 
 We now study what can be learned about the ATE when selection is endogenous.  With 
endogenous selection and reporting errors, there is uncertainty about counterfactual birth outcomes 
and about the reliability of the data on WIC particpation, W*.  Using the classification error model 
presented in Section 4, we derive partial verification identification bounds on the ATE in Equation 
(1) in Appendix A2. These bounds are formalized as Proposition 2.  
 In Section 5.1, we present bounds without imposing any restrictions to address the selection 
problem.  Then, to narrow these worst-case selection bounds, we apply a number of middle ground 
assumptions restricting the relationship between WIC participation, birth outcomes, and observed 
                                                 
19 Estimation results for all outcomes (normal birth weight, not low birth weight, not very low birth weight, not 
macrosomic weight, normal gestation, not premature, not very premature) will be provided in Section 5.4 when we 
additionally allow for endogenous selection.  
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covariates.  In Section 5.2, we consider the identifying power of several monotone instrumental 
variable assumptions and in Section 5.3 we examine the monotone treatment response assumption 
that, on average, WIC cannot lead to worse birth outcomes.  In these subsections, we present results 
for the normal birth weight outcome under the arbitrary error and no-false positive error models.  In 
this case, our assumptions addressing the selection problem substantially narrow the bounds but do 
not necessarily reveal the sign of the ATE unless one is willing to impose the MTR assumption. 
 Finally, in Section 5.4, we estimate bounds under for a number of different birth outcomes 
under two stronger verification assumptions: (1) the ME2 partial verification assumption that self-
reports of WIC participation from households reporting any type of government benefits are assumed 
to be accurate, and (2) the assumption of fully accurate reporting.  These verification models, where 
between 84% and 100% of respondents are assumed to provide accurate reports of WIC receipt, have 
substantial identifying power in this application.  In particular, we find that when combined with the 
other assumptions used to address the selection problem, WIC is estimated to have a beneficial effect 
on numerous birth outcomes. 
5.1.  Worst-Case Selection Bounds  
 Figure 2 displays the estimated bounds for the effects of WIC on the normal birth weight 
probability without imposing assumptions to address the selection problem.  This extends Figure 1 to 
the case that WIC participation is endogenous. As before, the corresponding table presents estimates 
if the true WIC participation rate P* is equal to the self-reported rate of 0.692 or the USDA 
administrative rate of 0.74.  Given uncertainty about the true participation rate, the figures trace out 
bounds on the ATE as P* varies. 
 Figure 2 highlights Manski’s (1995) worst case average treatment effect bounds on the 
normal birth weight probability, [ 0.358, 642]− , with width 1 for the case of no measurement error at 
* 0.692P =  given no false positives (or stronger verification).  These bounds expand to 
[ 0.459, 0.844]−  with width 1.3 at * 0.692P =  under arbitrary errors (no net errors in this case).  The 
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bounds shift to [ 0.412, 0.892]−  at * 0.74P =  under arbitrary errors, then narrow to [ 0.405, 0.690]−  or 
[ 0.362, 0.690]−  under no false positives or stronger verification, respectively.  Naturally, these 
bounds are quite wide in the absence of restrictions on the selection process into WIC participation.   
5.2  Monotone instrumental variables  
 5.2.1 Model Assumptions 
The Monotone Instrumental Variable (MIV) assumption (Manski and Pepper, 2000) 
formalizes the notion that the latent probability of a positive health outcome, [ ( ) 1],P H j =  varies 
monotonically with certain observed covariates.  To formalize this idea, let v be the monotone 
instrumental variable such that  
 1 2 1 2[ ( ) 1| ] [ ( ) 1| ] [ ( ) 1| ].u u u P H j v u P H j v u P H j v u≤ ≤ ⇒ = = ≤ = = ≤ = =                   (5) 
That is, the latent positive birth outcome probabilities weakly increase with the instrument v.   
We apply three MIV assumptions. First, similar to KPGJ, we assume that the latent 
probability of a favorable birth outcome increases with the ratio of household income to the poverty 
line accounting for family composition.20  A positive association between health and income has 
been clearly established in the literature.  Chen et al. (2002), for example, reports that child health 
improves monotonically with socioeconomic status, and Deaton (2002) provides evidence of a 
negative income gradient in realized health outcomes. Importantly, the MIV assumption in Equation 
(5) does not require the relationship between income and expected potential birth outcomes to be 
linear.  Indeed, there are known nonlinearities in the gradient between income and health (Deaton, 
2002), and the tax and transfer system introduces nonlinearity between income and net resources that 
are especially salient for lower income households.  If the relationship between income and net 
                                                 
20 To estimate these MIV bounds, we first divide the sample into nine income categories provided in the ECLS-B.  
We assume that the ratio of actual to potential net underreporting does not vary across MIV groups.  To find the 
MIV bounds on the rates of favorable health outcomes, one takes the appropriate weighted average of the plug-in 
estimators of lower and upper bounds across the groups.  As discussed in Manski and Pepper (2000), this MIV 
estimator is consistent but biased in finite samples.  We employ Kreider and Pepper’s (2007) modified MIV 
estimator that accounts for the finite sample bias using a nonparametric bootstrap correction method. 
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resources is monotonic, this MIV assumption seems credible.  However, programs like Medicaid, 
which introduce a discontinuous notch in the budget constraint, could lead the relationship between 
income and resources to be negative over part of the range, and thus potentially violate the MIV 
assumption.  Our preferred set of bounds on the ATE imposes this monotonicity assumption, but we 
also provide alternative estimates that do not. 
Second, we use eligibility criteria of WIC to construct a monotone instrument (see Gundersen 
et al. 2012).  Similar to a regression discontinuity design, we compare birth outcomes among WIC-
eligible households to those of higher-income ineligible households.21  While latent birth outcomes 
are unlikely to be mean independent of eligibility status (as assumed in a traditional discontinuity 
design), an MIV-ineligibles assumption holding that mean response varies monotonically across 
these groups seems credible. In particular, we assume that the latent probability of a healthy birth 
outcome among WIC-eligible households is no better than among higher-income ineligible 
households:     
                               [ ( ) 1] [ ( ) 1| ], 1,0.P H j P H j v ineligible j= ≤ = = =       (6) 
This ineligibility bound on the mean potential health outcome, [ ( ) 1]P H j = , has the unique property 
that ineligible households cannot participate in WIC.  Thus, W* = 0 among ineligible households.  
Assuming eligibility is observed, the data point-identify the mean outcome if all ineligible 
households were to have not participated in WIC, [ (0) 1| ]P H v ineligible= = , as the mean health 
status in the group of ineligibles, ( 1 | ).P H v ineligible= =   This quantity then serves as an upper 
bound on the potential outcome [ (0) 1]P H =  for the ATE in Equation (1) within our primary 
population of income-eligible households (Gundersen et al., 2012):  
[ (0) 1] ( 1| ).P H P H v ineligible= ≤ = =            (7) 
                                                 
21 In particular, we focus on households with socioeconomic status in the third or lower income quintile that were 
ineligible for WIC because their income exceeded 185 percent of the Poverty Income Guidelines (inc > 185%) and 
they were not adjunctively eligible via participation in other programs. As noted in Section 2, we do not directly 
observe adjunctive eligibility status.  Instead, to be conservative in our approach, we exclude households in this 
higher income comparison group that ever reported benefits from WIC, Medicaid, TANF or SNAP. 
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We learn nothing new about the mean outcome that would be realized if all households participated 
in WIC, [ (1) 1]P H = , using this approach because the outcome (1)H  is counterfactual within the 
ineligibles population.  In Appendix A3, we generalize Equation (7) to account for the possibility that 
adjunctive WIC eligibility through other programs may be measured with error.  
Finally, we consider the monotone treatment selection (MTS) assumption that the potential 
birth outcomes weakly decrease with the true WIC participation indicator such that (Manski and 
Pepper, 2000): 
   * *[ ( ) 1 | 1] [ ( ) 1| 0]   for 1,0.P H j W P H j W j= = ≤ = = =    (8) 
That is, on average, eligible households that chose to receive WIC, * 1,W =  have no better latent birth 
outcomes than eligible households that did not take up WIC, * 0.W = 22 
This assumption formalizes the consensus in the literature that there is negative selection into 
WIC; unobserved factors associated with poor birth outcomes are positively associated with WIC 
participation.  In fact, it is well established that WIC recipients have unfavorable demographic, 
socioeconomic, and health characteristics (e.g., Currie, 2003; Bitler and Currie, 2005; Ludwig and 
Miller, 2005; Gundersen, 2005; Currie and Rajani, 2015).  For example, in the ECLS-B sample used 
in this paper, respondents reporting to receive WIC reside in less educated households with fewer 
resources than those reporting not to receive WIC.  Likewise, Bitler and Currie (2005) find that those 
who chose to participate in WIC are negatively selected regarding education, age, marital status, 
father involvement with the birth, smoking behavior, obesity, use of public assistance last year, 
having wage income last year, having a bathroom in the household, and having had a previous low 
birth weight or premature infant (if not a first birth).  These findings hold across and within racial 
groups.  Thus, for selection on unobserved factors to be positive on average, WIC mothers would 
                                                 
22 Holding only on average, the MTS assumption in (8) does not rule out the possibility that selection is positive for 
some women.  Positive selection could result, for example, if relatively motivated and informed women are more 
likely to enroll and have better birth outcomes.  Likewise, positive spurious associations might arise from the fact 
that women with longer pregnancies have more opportunity to enroll in WIC – sometimes referred to as gestational 
age bias (see Section 2.2 for further details) (Joyce, Gibson and Colman, 2005; Joyce, Racine, and Yunzal-Butler, 
2008). 
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need to be negatively selected across this wide range of observables yet positively selected on 
unobservables. Based on the totality of this evidence, Bitler and Currie (2005) find it implausible that 
potentially positive selection on unobservables (e.g., nutrition knowledge or desire to be a good 
mother) could outweigh known strong negative selection across a wide spectrum of observed 
characteristics: “While it remains theoretically possible that WIC mothers might be positively 
selected, all the evidence points in the opposite direction” (p. 88).   
  5.2.2 Results for normal birth weight with arbitrary errors and no-false positive errors 
 Figure 3, along with the corresponding table, displays estimated lower bounds (only lower 
bounds are shown in the figure to save space) on the impact of WIC for the normal birth weight 
outcome under various MIV restrictions.  Here, we consider identification under arbitrary errors or 
no false positives.  We focus on estimates of the ATE at * 0.74oP P= = , the administrative WIC 
participation rate.   
 Recall that the worst-case endogenous selection bounds at * 0.74P =  in Figure 2 revealed that 
the ATE could lie anywhere in the range [ 0.412, 0.892]−  under arbitrary errors, which contracted 
modestly to [ 0.405, 0.690]−  under no false positives.  In Figure 3 and corresponding table, these 
ranges narrow substantially to  [ 0.191, 0.886]−  and [ 0.129, 0.678]− , respectively, under the MTS and 
income-MIV monotonicity assumptions.  Still, we cannot rule out the possibility that WIC 
participation has either a strong negative or positive effect on birth weight.   
The MIV-ineligibles assumption imposes the restriction that, on average, infants born into 
higher-income ineligible households have no worse latent birth outcomes than infants born into WIC 
eligible households.  Adding this assumption to the MTS + income MIV assumptions dramatically 
improves the lower bound at * 0.74P =  to -0.0221 under arbitrary errors and to -0.0179 under no false 
positive classifications.  At this preferred value of *P , notice that it makes little difference whether 
WIC classification errors follow an arbitrary process or are confined to false negatives: the no false 
positives assumption has little additional identifying power.   
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This is not the case, however, if *P  is closer to the self-reported rate of P = 0.692.  Returning 
to Figure 3, the ATE can be identified as strictly positive under this joint MTS + income MIV + 
ineligible MIV model if P* lies between 0.692 and 0.72 – but only under the no false positives 
assumption (dashed line), not under arbitrary errors (solid line).  Under no false positives at 
* 0.692P P= =  (no misreporting at all), we can identify that WIC leads to at least a 6.64 percentage 
point improvement in the probability of having a normal birth weight, or by at least 33%.23  As 
shown in the table beneath Figure 3, the confidence interval for the ATE lies strictly above 0.  
Identification then deteriorates as *P  rises.  When *P  is about 0.72, we can no longer identify whether 
the ATE is positive or negative.  And with arbitrary errors, we cannot identify the sign of the ATE 
for any value of *P  without additional assumptions.   
5.3.  Monotone Treatment Response 
    There is a general consensus among policymakers and researchers that prenatal WIC 
participation should not lead to worse birth outcomes (Currie, 2003; Ludwig and Miller, 2005).  
Given this consensus, we consider the identifying power of a Monotone Treatment Response (MTR) 
assumption (see Manski, 1995 and 1997; Pepper 2000) that formalizes the idea that WIC 
participation would not lead to a reduction in favorable birth outcomes, on average, conditional on 
true participation status:  
      * *[ (1) 1| ] [ (0) 1| ].P H W P H W= ≥ =            (9) 
This assumption seems relatively innocuous in our application since WIC restricts purchased food 
products to be nutritionally sound while providing education and preventative health services.   
Notice that the assumption, which restrictions the average potential outcome, allows for the 
possibility that WIC could be harmful for some household.  
                                                 
23 The lower bound percentage reduction in unfavorable birth outcomes under the program is { [ (1) 1] [ (0) 1]}P H P H− = − =   
/ [ (0) 1].P H =   
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 Since MTR precludes harmful effects of WIC on average, it would be circular reasoning to 
use this assumption in support of evidence that the average treatment effect is nonnegative: indeed, 
0ATE ≥  by construction.  Nevertheless, MTR does not rule out a value of 0 (even when combined 
with the MTS and MIV assumptions), especially after accounting for sampling variability.  We 
impose this assumption because it can be informative in further bounding the magnitude of the ATE 
when combined with other identifying assumptions; if MTR on average is plausible, then it makes 
sense to impose the assumption.   
The results displayed in Figure 3 show that the MTR assumption (that WIC is not harmful on 
average) has strong identifying power in this application.  Combined with the preceding 
monotonicity assumptions, we can identify that WIC improves the probability of a healthy birth 
weight outcome at * 0.74P =   by at least 3.86 percentage points, or 21 percent, under the arbitrary 
error model.  The average treatment effect is strictly positive, and statistically significant, even for 
large degrees of arbitrary WIC misreporting.  We find similar results (not shown) when we replace 
the normal birth weight outcome with normal gestation duration.  Specifically, we can identify that 
WIC decreases the probability of an unfavorable gestation duration by at least 2.69 percentage 
points, or 9.9 percent.  As above, this estimate is statistically significant and robust to large values 
of P*.  
5.4.  Verifying those reporting government benefits  
Finally, we examine the identifying power of the stronger classification error assumption that 
allows for the verification of a mixture of positive and negative WIC participation responses.  As a 
reference point, findings for the special case of full verification (no misreporting) are summarized in 
Tables 2A and 2B.  In that case, the MTS-MIV model (row iv) identifies the ATE as positive for all 
seven outcomes, though the confidence interval includes zero for several outcomes (not low birth 
weight, not premature and not very premature).   
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Our preferred findings allow for WIC classification errors consistent with * 0.74P = .  We  
treat responses about WIC receipt as reliable if the household reported any type of government 
benefits, remaining agnostic about the reliability of the responses for households that claim no 
benefits from any source.  Recall that 84% of households are verified to provide accurate reports in 
this partial verification model.   
Tables 3A and 3B summarize our findings at * 0.74P =  for all six birth outcomes across the 
spectrum of monotonicity assumptions under the stronger verification assumption.  Strictly positive 
estimated average treatment effects are highlighted in bold.  Given this model, the key finding is that 
WIC is found to have a strictly positive impact on birth weight outcomes under the MTS and MIV 
assumptions alone, without imposing MTR.  Row (iv) reveals that the ATE of prenatal WIC 
participation can be identified as strictly positive for the “not very low birth weight” and “not 
macrosomic birth weight” outcomes when imposing only the MTS and income MIV monotonicity 
assumptions.  Row (v) reveals that we can further identify a strictly positive impact of the program 
for the normal birth weight outcome after additionally imposing the MIV-ineligibles assumption.  
Specifically, we estimate that WIC improves the probability of a normal birth weight by at least 1.76 
percentage points, or 10.4%.  This estimate is statistically significantly different from zero.24  
Row (vi) reveals that we can identify a strictly positive impact for all birth outcomes except 
“not low birth weight” when also imposing the MTR assumption.  For example, the probability of a 
normal birth weight is estimated to increase by at least 3.92 percentage points and the probability of a 
normal gestation age is estimated to increase by at least 2.69 percentage points.  
Importantly, this finding highlights the methodological contribution of the ME2 verification 
assumption and the Proposition 2 bounds.  Our methods allow us to sign the ATE without imposing 
                                                 
24We continue to estimate a strictly positive average treatment effect even when allowing for errors in measuring 
adjunctive eligibility (see Section 5.2 and Appendix A3).  In particular, the estimated bounds are positive as long as 
less than 16 percent of our labeled “ineligible” households with an unfavorable birth weight outcome were in fact 
adjunctively eligible.   
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the MTR assumption if and only if we can treat WIC participation responses as accurate for some 
households that claim not to have received WIC benefits.  In contrast, the methods in KPGJ do not 
have this flexibility to verify mixtures of positive and negative participation responses. 
6.  Conclusion      
Driven in part by the growing perception that early life conditions have long term impacts on 
adult life outcomes (e.g., Heckman and Carneiro, 2003; Almond and Currie, 2011) and in part by 
concerns over discretionary government spending, there has been a renewed interest in understanding 
the impact of WIC on infant health.  Researchers have struggled to draw credible inferences of causal 
impacts in the presence of unobserved counterfactual outcomes and underreported WIC participation.  
Even small amounts of nonclassical measurement error in a treatment variable can be sufficient to 
overturn conclusions that rely on the treatment being accurately measured.  Moreover, prior studies 
tend to find that the instruments (typically variation in state program regulations) are not strongly 
associated with WIC receipt.  It is difficult to find strong instruments for food assistance programs 
like SNAP and WIC since these programs exhibit relatively little geographic variation in benefit 
rules compared with programs like Medicaid and TANF.25 
In this paper, we complement the existing literature by considering what can be learned about 
the efficacy of prenatal WIC in improving birth outcomes when program participation may be 
endogenous and underreported.  While our framework does not allow us to point-identify average 
treatment effects, we derive sharp bounds under arbitrary misclassification of the treatment indicator 
combined with relatively weak monotonicity assumptions on the selection process.  For example, 
standard IVs are replaced with monotone IVs.  Throughout, we assess the sensitivity of inferences to 
variations in assumptions about the selection and measurement error problems.  These monotonicity 
assumptions are not innocuous, but by considering different assumptions in a layered transparent 
fashion we illustrate clear tradeoffs between the strength of the assumptions and the findings.  
                                                 
25 Bitler and Currie (2005, p. 75) conclude  that variation in WIC program regulations are likely to make poor 
instruments for WIC participation, rendering estimates based on them potentially unreliable. 
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Overall, these estimated partial identification bounds highlight how inferences are sensitive 
to assumptions.  Under the weakest models allowing for both the selection and classification error 
problems, the bounds do not identify whether WIC increases or decreases the probability of healthy 
birth outcomes.  However, under stronger but credible models, we find that WIC improves infant 
health across a spectrum of outcomes.  When combining all of our nonparametric identifying 
assumptions in a model with partial verification of WIC classification (84% verified), we find that 
WIC has a substantial impact on birth outcomes, increasing the likelihood of normal birth weight by 
at least 3.92 percentage points, or 21.3 percent, and normal gestation age by at least 2.69 percentage 
points, or 9.9 percent. Under full verification where all responses are known to be accurate, these 
lower bounds increase to 6.54 and 9.51 percentage points, respectively.  Using these alternative 
partial identification methods that allow for underreported WIC participation, our findings lend 
further support to recent studies that have concluded that WIC does work in achieving its main 
objectives.   
 Finally, although the contributions of this paper are largely empirical in nature, we also 
derive new closed-form bounds on average treatment effects that extend the nonparametric methods 
developed in KPGJ.  Specifically, we extend their approach to provide sharp bounds on average 
treatment effects under a “partial verification” assumption that allows a researcher to explicitly be 
confident in the reliability of the treatment variable (e.g., WIC participation) for some respondents 
but not others.  The methods in KPGJ do not afford this flexibility to verify mixtures of positive and 
negative participation responses.  In our application, we combine the verification assumption with 
auxiliary data from the USDA that places restrictions on the net WIC misreporting rate.  We derive 
sharp bounds on the average treatment effect for both the reference case of exogenous selection and 
endogenous nonrandom selection.  We also derive parallel sets of bounds for the case that the 
researcher has no auxiliary information about the true participation rate.  These new methods will 
hopefully prove especially useful to researchers who have available some form of validation data, 
even when the validation data do not comprise a random sample of the primary data. 
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Appendices  
A1. Bounds on the mean outcome gap, β, with classification errors 
To make progress in partially identifying this gap, we decompose the first term in Equation (2) into 
identified and unidentified quantities: 
  
*
* 1 1
* *
( 1, 1)( 1, 1)( 1| 1)
( 1) ( 1)
P H WP H WP H W
P W P W
θ θ− += = + −= =
= = = =
= =
                   (A1) 
where the probability of having a healthy birth outcome and self-reporting WIC receipt, 
( 1, 1),P H W= =  is identified by the data with *( , 1, 0)j P H j W Wθ
+ = = = =  and 
*( , 0, 1)j P H j W Wθ
− = = = =  denoting the unobserved fraction of false positive and false negative 
classifications of WIC recipients, respectively, for infants realizing birth outcome j = 1, 0.  In the 
numerator, 1 1θ θ
− +−  reflects the unobserved excess of false negative versus false positive 
classifications among those with a favorable birth outcome.  The quantity *( 1 | 0)P H W= =  can be 
decomposed analogously.    
The ME1 and ME2 assumptions imply informative upper bounds on the false reporting 
probabilities 1 0 1, ,θ θ θ
− − + and 0 .θ
+  Specifically, it follows that  
        { }* 12min ( , 0, 0), , ( ) ,      1,0i i UBuP H i W V P Q iθ θ− −≤ = = = + ∆ ≡ =      (A2)  
        { }* 12min ( , 1, 0), 1 , ( ) ,      1,0.i i UBuP H i W V P Q iθ θ+ +≤ = = = − − ∆ ≡ =     (A3) 
where ∆ is the difference in false negative and positive reporting rates described in Section 3: 
  * 1 0 1 0( ) ( ).P P θ θ θ θ
− − + +∆ = − = + − − 26       (A4) 
Given these restrictions on the degree and nature of classification errors, we have the 
following proposition:  
                                                 
26 With verification, P* is logically required to lie within the range 1[max{ ( 1, 0), ( 1, 1) },UBP P W V P H W θ +Λ = − = = = = −  
1min{ ( 0, 0),1 ( 1, 0) }]
UBP P W V P H W θ −+ = = − = = + .  Intuitively, P* cannot be too far away from P when some 
households are known to provide valid responses.  Under no false positives (and no further verification), this range 
reduces to * [ ,1].P P∈   
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Proposition 1  Given the classification error model restrictions in Equations (A2) and (A3), the 
outcome gap, ,β  under partial verification is bounded as follows:  
     
*
1 0
* *
*
1 0
* *
( 1, 1) ( 1) min{ , }
(1 )
                             
( 1, 1) ( 1) min{ , }.
(1 )
UB UB
UB UB
P H W P P H
P P
P H W P P H
P P
θ θ
β
θ θ
+ −
− +
= = − = − − ∆
−
≤ ≤
= = − = + + ∆
−
   
for * (0,1).P ∈ Λ ∩ 27 
Proof:  We can write the average treatment effect as  
1 1
* *
( 1, 1) ( 1) ( 1) .
( 1) ( 0)
P H W P W P HATE
P W P W
θ θ− += = − = = + −
=
= =
    (A5)  
Thus, subject to restrictions on the unknown classification error rates in ME1, ME2, and Equations 
(A2)-(A4) and the laws of probability,28 the upper bound is found by maximizing 1θ
− and minimizing 
1θ
+.  Likewise, the lower bound is found by minimizing 1θ
− and maximizing 1θ
+.  Let 1 1 .θ θ
− +Ψ = −   
 If 0∆ ≥  (net false negative reporting):  For the upper bound, first consider the case that 
1 .
UBθ − < ∆    Here, 1θ
− cannot exceed 1
UBθ −  and 1θ
+ cannot fall below 0 so that 1 .
UBθ −Ψ ≤   At this upper 
bound, Equation (A4) implies that 0 1
UBθ θ− −= ∆ −  and 0 0θ
+ = .  If 1 ,
UBθ − ≥ ∆  1θ
− cannot exceed 
1 0min{ , }
UB UBθ θ− + + ∆  and 1θ
+ cannot fall below 0 so that 1 0min{ , }.
UB UBθ θ− +Ψ ≤ + ∆   At this upper bound, 
Equation (A4) implies 0 0θ
− =  and 0 0 1min{ , }
UB UBθ θ θ+ + −= − ∆ .  For the lower bound, first consider the 
case that 0 .
UBθ − < ∆    Here, 0θ
− cannot exceed 0
UBθ −  so from Equation (A4) we know that 1θ
− must be no 
less than 0 .
UBθ −∆ −   From Equation (A3), we know that jθ
+ can exceed 0 but any conjectured increase 
in the false positive error rate must be offset by an equivalent increase in the false negative error rate.  
So, in this case, the lower bound would be unchanged by increasing jθ
+ above 0.  Thus, we have 
                                                 
27 If the valid range Λ includes 1 (in which the denominator in the proposition is 0), the bounds converge to 
[ ( 0), ( 1)]P H P H− = =  as *P  approaches 1.  Similarly, if the valid range includes 0, the bounds converge to  
[ ( 1), ( 0)]P H P H− = =  as *P  approaches 0. 
28 In particular, *( 1 | 1)P H W= =  and *( 1 | 0)P H W= =  lie within [0,1].   
 
34 
0 .
UBθ −Ψ ≥ ∆ −   If 0 ,
UBθ − ≥ ∆   Ψ is minimized when 0 0 1min{ , }
UB UBθ θ θ− − += + ∆ , 1 0θ
− = , 
1 1 0min{ , }
UB UBθ θ θ+ + −= − ∆ , and 0 0θ
+ =  so that 1 0min{ , }.
UB UBθ θ+ −Ψ ≥ − − ∆  
 If 0∆ ≤  (net false positive reporting): For the upper bound, first consider the case that 
0 .
UBθ + < −∆    Here, 0θ
+ cannot exceed 0
UBθ +  so from Equation (A4) we know that 1θ
+ must be no less 
than 0 .
UBθ +−∆ −   From Equation (A2), we know that jθ
− can exceed 0 but any conjectured increase in 
the false negative error rate must be offset by an equivalent increase in the false positive error rate.  
So, in this case, the upper bound would be unchanged by increasing jθ
− above 0.  Thus, we have 
0 .
UBθ +Ψ ≤ −∆ −   If 0 ,
UBθ + ≥ −∆   Ψ is maximized when 0 0 1min{ , }
UB UBθ θ θ+ + −= − ∆ , 1 0θ
+ = , 
1 1 0min{ , }
UB UBθ θ θ− − += + ∆ , and 0 0θ
− =  so that 1 0min{ , }.
UB UBθ θ− +Ψ ≤ + ∆   For the lower bound, first 
consider the case that 1 .
UBθ + < −∆    Here, 1θ
+ cannot exceed 1
UBθ +  and 1θ
− cannot fall below 0 so that 
1 .
UBθ +Ψ ≥ −   At this lower bound, Equation (A4) implies that 0 1
UBθ θ+ += −∆ −  and 0 0θ
− = .  If 1 ,
UBθ + ≥ −∆  
1θ
+ cannot exceed 1 0min{ , }
UB UBθ θ+ − − ∆  and 1θ
− cannot fall below 0 so that 1 0min{ , }.
UB UBθ θ+ −Ψ ≥ − − ∆   
At this lower bound, Equation (A4) implies 0 0θ
+ =  and 0 0 1min{ , }.
UB UBθ θ θ− − += + ∆   Combining these 
results, it follows that  1 0 1 0min{ , } min{ , }
UB UB UB UBθ θ θ θ+ − − +− − ∆ ≤ Ψ ≤ + ∆ .       
 
In an arbitrary errors model ( 1uQ = ), these bounds simplify: 
Corollary 1  Under arbitrary errors, the Proposition 1 bounds reduce to: 
        * * * *
( 1) ( 0) ( 0) ( 1)min , min , .
1 1
P H P H P H P H
P P P P
β= = = =   − ≤ ≤   
− −   
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Proof of Corollary 1:  Under the arbitrary errors model, 1.uQ =   From Equation (A3), we know that
{ }* *10 2min ( 1) ( 1, 1), ( 0), [ ( 1) ( 0)]UB P W P H W P W P W P Wθ + + ∆ = = − = = = = + =  and
{ }* *11 2min ( 1, 0), ( 1), [ ( 1) ( 0)] .UB P H W P W P W P Wθ − = = = = = + =  Thus, it follows that 
{ } { }*1 0min , min ( 1) ( 1, 1), ( 1, 0) .UB UB P W P H W P H Wθ θ− + + ∆ = = − = = = =                      (A6) 
                                                 
29 As in Proposition 1, these bounds are defined over * (0,1),P ∈ Λ ∩  where Λ is defined in the previous footnote.   
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Likewise, from Equations (A2) and (A3) we know that
{ }* *10 2min ( 0) ( 1, 0), ( 1), [ ( 0) ( 1)]UB P W P H W P W P W P Wθ − − ∆ = = − = = = = + =  and 
{ }* *11 2min ( 1, 1), ( 0), [ ( 0) ( 1)] .UB P H W P W P W P Wθ + = = = = = + =   Thus, it follows that 
{ } { }*1 0min , min ( 0) ( 1, 0), ( 1, 1) .UB UB P W P H W P H Wθ θ+ − − ∆ = = − = = = =           (A7)   
Substituting (A6) into Proposition 1 obtains an upper bound of  *
( 0)
1
P H
P
=
−
  if * ( 1)P P H≤ =   and 
*
( 1)P H
P
=   if * ( 1)P P H≥ = , which reduces to * *
( 0) ( 1)min ,
1
P H P H
P P
= = 
 
− 
.  Similarly, the lower bound 
is obtained using Equation (A7).         
Exogenous selection bounds when P* is not known 
If Assumptions ME1 and ME2 hold under arbitrary errors but the researcher has no auxiliary 
information about the value of *P , sharp bounds on β  are given as follows:   
 
 
1 1 0 1 0
1 1
1 0 1 0
[0, ], [0,min{ , }]
( 1, 1) ( 1, 0)inf
( 1) ( 0)uUB UB
LB
Q
P H W P H W
P W P Wθ θ θ θ θ
θ θ
β
θ θ θ θ+ + − + −
+ +
+ − + −∈ ∈ −
 = = − = = +
= − = − + = + − 
  
 
1 1 0 1 0
1 1
1 0 1 0
[0, ], [0,min{ , }]
( 1, 1) ( 1, 0)sup .
( 1) ( 0)uUB UB
UB
Q
P H W P H W
P W P Wθ θ θ θ θ
θ θ
β
θ θ θ θ− − + − +
− −
− + − +∈ ∈ −
 = = + = = −
= − = + − = − + 
  
 
These bounds are obtained by minimizing or maximizing * *( 1 | 1) ( 1| 0)P H W P H W= = − = =  using 
Equation (A1) and its analogous counterpart for *( 1 | 0)P H W= = .  They can be estimated by 
conducting separate grid searches over 1 0{ , }θ θ
+ −  and 1 0{ , }θ θ
− +  in the feasible regions to minimize LBβ  
and maximize UBβ  subject to the constraint that none of the conditional probabilities (given by the 
ratios) exceed 1.  Under the no false positives assumption, these bounds simplify to:   
  
0 0
0 0
[0, ]
( 1, 1) ( 1, 0)inf
( 1) ( 0)UB
LB P H W P H WATE
P W P Wθ θ θ θ− − − −∈
 = = = =
= − = + = − 
  
  
0 1
1 1
1 1
[0, ]
( 1, 1) ( 1, 0)sup .
( 1) ( 0)UB
UB P H W P H WATE
P W P Wθ θ
θ θ
θ θ+ −
− −
− −∈
 = = + = = −
= − = + = − 
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A2.  Sharp bounds under endogenous selection and classification errors 
KPGJ show that the worst-case selection bounds on the ATE with classification errors can be 
written as 
        
( )
( )
( )
[ 1, 0 ( 0, 1)] Θ
                   1,0
[ 1, 1 ( 0, 0)] Θ                                      (A8)
P H W P H W
ATE
P H W P H W
− = = + = = +
≤ ≤
= = + = = +
  
where 1 0 0 1( ) ( ).θ θ θ θ
− + − +Θ ≡ + − +  In the absence of classification errors, 0,Θ =  and Equation (A8) 
simplifies to Manski’s (1995) worst-case selection bounds.  With classification errors, the models 
from Section 4 allow us to place informative restrictions on Θ.   Extending KPGJ’s Proposition 1 to 
incorporate partial verification, we have:  
Proposition 2:  Given the bounds on the ATE in Equation (A8), combined with restrictions ME1, 
ME2, and (A2)-(A4) on classification errors, endogenous selection bounds on the ATE under partial 
verification are given by:  
 
1 0
1 0
[ ( 1, 0) ( 0, 1)] max{ 2 , 2 }
                                         (1,0)
 [ ( 1, 1) ( 0, 0)] min{2 ,2 }.
UB UB
UB UB
P H W P H W
ATE
P H W P H W
θ θ
θ θ
+ −
− +
− = = − = = + − − ∆ − + ∆
≤ ≤
= = + = = + − ∆ + ∆
  
Proof: This proof follows the structure of the proof of Proposition 1 in KPGJ but allows for 
verification and an upper bound error rate.  These restrictions are embedded in restrictions ME1, 
ME2, and (A2)-(A4).  The upper bound is found by maximizing 1 0( )θ θ
− ++  and minimizing 0 1( ),θ θ
− ++  
and vice versa for the lower bound.   
 If 0∆ ≥ :  For the upper bound, first consider the case that 1
UBθ − ≥ ∆.  Then 0 1( )θ θ
− ++  is 
minimized at 0 and Equation (A4) simplifies to 1 0 .θ θ
− += ∆ +   It follows that 0θ
+ cannot exceed 
{ }0 1min ,UB UBθ θ+ − − ∆  and 1θ − cannot exceed { }0 1min , .UB UBθ θ+ −∆ +   The upper bound follows directly.  
Second, consider the case that 1 .
UBθ − < ∆   We know that 1θ
− cannot exceed 1
UBθ −  and, to satisfy the 
restriction in Equation (A4), 0θ
− must be no less than 1 .
UBθ −∆ −   As before, 1θ
+ is minimized at 0.  
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While 0θ
+ can exceed 0, any conjectured increase in the false positive error rate must be offset by an 
equivalent increase in the false negative error rate.  So, in this case, the upper bound would be 
unchanged by increasing 0θ
+ above 0.  Thus, we have the upper bound on Θ of 12
UBθ − − ∆ which can 
be shown to be no greater than 02 .
UBθ + + ∆    
For the lower bound, first consider the case that 0
UBθ − ≥ ∆.  Then 1 0( )θ θ
− ++  is minimized at 0 
and Equation (A4) simplifies to 0 1 .θ θ
− += ∆ +   It follows that 1θ
+ cannot exceed { }1 0min ,UB UBθ θ+ − − ∆  
and 0θ
− cannot exceed { }1 0min ,UB UBθ θ+ −∆ +  so that { }1 0max 2 , 2UB UBθ θ+ −− − ∆ − + ∆  provides the lower 
bound on Θ.  Second, consider the case that 0 .
UBθ − < ∆   We know that 0θ
− cannot exceed 0
UBθ −  and, to 
satisfy the restriction in Equation (A4), 1θ
− must be no less than 0 .
UBθ −∆ −   As before, 0θ
+ is minimized 
at 0.  While 1θ
+ can exceed 0, any conjectured increase in the false positive error rate must be offset 
by an equivalent increase in the false negative error rate.  So, in this case, the lower bound would be 
unchanged by increasing 1θ
+ above 0.  Thus, we have the lower bound on Θ of 02
UBθ −− + ∆ which can 
be shown to be no smaller than 12 .
UBθ +− − ∆  
 If 0∆ < :  For the upper bound, first consider the case that 0
UBθ + ≥ −∆.  Then 0 1( )θ θ
− ++  is 
minimized at 0 and Equation (A4) simplifies to 0 1 .θ θ
+ −= −∆ +   We know that 1θ
− cannot exceed 
{ }1 0min ,UB UBθ θ− + + ∆  and 0θ + cannot exceed { }0 1min , .UB UBθ θ+ −−∆ +   The upper bound follows directly.  
Second, consider the case that 0 .
UBθ + < −∆   We know that 0θ
+ cannot exceed 0
UBθ +  and, to satisfy the 
restriction in Equation (A4), 1θ
+ must be no less than 0 .
UBθ +−∆ −   As before, 0θ
− is minimized at 0.  
While 1θ
− can exceed 0, any conjectured increase in the false negative error rate must be offset by an 
equivalent increase in the false positive error rate.  So, in this case, the upper bound would be 
unchanged by increasing 1θ
− above 0.  Thus, we have the upper bound on Θ of 02
UBθ + + ∆ which can be 
shown to be no greater than 12 .
UBθ − − ∆    
For the lower bound, first consider the case that 1
UBθ + ≥ −∆.  Then 1 0( )θ θ
− ++  is minimized at 0 
and Equation (A4) simplifies to 1 0 .θ θ
+ −= −∆ +   We know that 0θ
− cannot exceed { }0 1min ,UB UBθ θ− + + ∆  
and 1θ
+ cannot exceed { }1 0min ,UB UBθ θ+ −−∆ +  so that { }1 0max 2 , 2UB UBθ θ+ −− − ∆ − + ∆  provides the lower 
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bound on Θ.  Second, consider the case that 1 .
UBθ + < −∆   We know that 1θ
+ cannot exceed 1
UBθ +  and, to 
satisfy the restriction in Equation (A4), 0θ
+ must be no less than 1 .
UBθ +−∆ −   As before, 1θ
− is 
minimized at 0.  While 0θ
− can exceed 0, any conjectured increase in the false negative error rate must 
be offset by an equivalent increase in the false positive error rate.  So, in this case, the lower bound 
would be unchanged by increasing 0θ
− above 0.  Thus, we have the lower bound of 12
UBθ +− − ∆ which 
can be shown to be no smaller than 02 .
UBθ −− + ∆         
 Adding the MTR and income MIV assumptions to this model is straightforward.  Under 
MTS, the ATE is bounded from above by the outcome gap in birth outcomes among recipients and 
nonrecipients:  
       * *(1,0) ( 1| 1) ( 1| 0).ATE P H W P H W≤ = = − = =   
This upper bound is not operational when W* is unobserved since these conditional means are not 
identified.  Proposition 1, however, provides bounds on this outcome gap. 
Endogenous selection bounds when P* is not known30 
 If Assumptions ME1 and ME2 hold under arbitrary errors but the researcher does not know 
the value of *P , sharp bounds on the ATE are given as follows:31  
       1 0
0 1
( 1, 1) ( 1, 0) ( 1) min{ , }
( 1, 1) ( 1, 0) ( 0) min{ , }.
LB UB UB
u
UB UB UB
u
ATE P H W P H W P W Q
ATE P H W P H W P W Q
θ θ
θ θ
+ −
+ −
= = = − = = − = − +
= = = − = = + = + +
 
Naturally, these bounds when *P  is unknown are wider than the Proposition 2 bounds when *P  is 
known.  Under no false positives, these bounds narrow to:  
          
0
1
( 1, 1) ( 1, 0) ( 1)
( 1, 1) ( 1, 0) ( 0) .
LB UB
UB UB
ATE P H W P H W P W
ATE P H W P H W P W
θ
θ
−
−
= = = − = = − = −
= = = − = = + = +
 
                                                 
30 McCarthy, Millimet, and Roy (2015) develop a Stata command for these bounds. 
31 The ATE is given by * * * *[ (1) 1] [ (0) 1] [ (1) 1 | 1] ( 1) [ (1) 1 | 0] ( 0)P H P H P H W P W P H W P W= − = = = = = + = = =  
* * * *[ (0) 1 | 1] ( 1) [ (0) 1 | 0] ( 0).P H W P W P H W P W− = = = − = = =   Letting *[ (1) 1 | 0]P H W= =  and 
*[ (0) 1 | 1]P H W= =  vary within [0, 1], the ATE is no smaller than  * * *( 1, 1) ( 1) ( 1, 0)P H W P W P H W= = − = − = =   
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1[ ( 1, 1) ] [ ( 1) ] [ ( 1, 0) ]P H W P W P H Wθ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ
− + − − + + + −= = = + − − = + + − − − = = + −  
0 0 1 1( 1, 1) ( 1) ( 1, 0) .P H W P W P H W θ θ θ θ
− + + −= = = − = − = = − + − +   The lower bound is obtained by setting 
0 1 0θ θ
+ −= =  and recognizing that the sum of errors cannot exceed Qu.  The upper bound is derived analogously. 
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A3. MIV ineligible bounds with mislabeled ineligibility  
Since ineligible households did not receive prenatal WIC benefits ( *185% and 0inc B> =  implies 
* 0W = ),32 it follows that [ (0) 1]P H =  cannot exceed *( 1 | 0, )P H B v ineligible= = = , where v denotes 
selecting the comparison group based on 185%inc >  (income-ineligible), SES ≤ 3, and B = 0. This 
conditional probability can be written as 
       
*
1 1
*
1 0 1 0
( 1, 0 | )( 1, =0| )
( =0| ) ( 0 | ) ( ) ( )
P H B vP H B v
P B v P B v
θ θ
θ θ θ θ
+ −
+ + − −
= = + −=
=
= + + − +
 
   
 
where *( , 1, 0 | )j P H j B B vθ
+ ≡ = = =  and *( , 0, 1 | )j P H j B B vθ
− ≡ = = =  denote false positive and 
false negative adjunctive eligibility classifications for 1,0.j =   
Since we selected our sample of apparent ineligibles based partly on B = 0 (no self-reported 
participation in any WIC-related program), the conditional probability simplifies to  
                1
1 0
( 1 | ) .
1
P H I θ
θ θ
−
− −
= −
− −

 
 
The worst-case upper bound is obtained by setting 1 0θ
− = : 
     *
( 1 | ) ( 1 | )[ (0) 1]
1 ( 0, 1| ) 1 ( 0 | )
P H v P H vP H
P H B v P H vθ
= =
= ≤ =
− = = − =
   
where, as described in the main text, *( 1 | 0, )P B H vθ ≡ = =  is the fraction of households in the 
unfavorable health outcome subset of the apparent ineligibles that did, in fact, receive benefits from a 
WIC-related program. 
                                                 
32 In some instances, the government might erroneously award benefits to a household that did not meet statutory 
eligibility criteria (e.g., administrative error).  Conceptually, however, we treat any household that was actually 
awarded benefits as de facto eligible.   
  
Table 1. Reported Prenatal WIC Participation and Birth Outcomes 
 
   
Differences: 
WIC vs. No WIC 
 Mean St. Dev. Mean p-value 
Reported prenatal WIC receipt (1 = Yes) 0.692 0.462 
  Normal birthweight: 2500-4000 grams (1=yes) 0.848 0.359  0.0195 0.09 
Birthweight ≥ 2500 grams, Not low birthweight (1 = yes) 0.928 0.259  0.00246 0.76 
Birthweight ≥ 1500 grams, Not very low (1 = yes) 0.988 0.110  0.00337 0.33 
Birthweight ≤ 4000 grams, Not macrosomic (1 = yes) 0.920 0.271  0.0171 0.05 
Gestation age: 38-42 weeks, Normal gestation age (1 = yes) 0.752 0.432 -0.0100 0.47 
Gestation age ≥ 37 weeks, Not premature (1 = yes) 0.882 0.322 -0.0188 0.07 
Gestation age ≥ 33 weeks, Not very premature (1 = yes) 0.968 0.176 -0.00361 0.52 
N = 4750     
 
Note: The sample includes 9-month old children from households with reported income at or below 185% of the Federal 
Poverty Guidelines along with households reporting prenatal Medicaid participation. All analyses are weighted using 
Wave 1 specific sample weights.   
  
Figure 1. Sharp Bounds on the ATE for “Normal Birth Weight” (2500-4000 grams) as a Function of P*, 
       the Unobserved True WIC Participation Rate: Exogenous Selection  
 
  
 
                           Self-reported           Administrative 
                           participation rate:         participation rate: 
                                  P* = P = 0.692             P* = Po = 0.74             
     
Exogenous selection               
 
     (a) Arbitrary errors       p.e.†   [-0.219,   0.494]    0.713       [-0.205,    0.584]   0.789  
                       CI‡   [-0.230    0.523]             [-0.215     0.622]    
                
(b) No false positives     p.e.   [ 0.0195,  0.0195]  0.000       [-0.188,   0.0592] 0.264 
               CI   [-0.0022   0.0409]           [-0.204     0.0784] 
                
(c) Verified if reported    p.e.   [ 0.0195,  0.0195]  0.000       [-0.0759,  0.0592] 0.135 
 any gov’t benefits     CI   [-0.0022   0.0409]                [-0.0912  0.0784] 
  
 
Strictly positive average treatment effects in bold 
† Point estimates of the population bounds 
‡ Imbens-Manski 5th and 95th percentile bounds (1,000 pseudosamples)
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Figure 2. Sharp Bounds on the ATE for “Normal Birth Weight” (2500-4000 grams) as a Function of P*, 
       the Unobserved True WIC Participation Rate: Worst Case Endogenous Selection Bounds  
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† Point estimates of the population bounds 
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Figure 3. Sharp Lower Bounds on the ATE for “Normal Birth Weight” as a Function of P*:  
                Endogenous Selection Bounds with MTS, MTR, Income MIV, and Ineligibles MIV 
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Table 2A. Sharp Bounds on the ATE of WIC Under No Classification Error, Birth Weight 
 
   Birth Weight 
   
Normal 
(2500-4000 g.) 
 
Not Low 
( ≥ 2500 g.) 
 
Not Very Low 
( ≥ 1500 g.) 
 
Not Macrosomic 
( ≤ 4000 g.) 
 
(i) ETSc                  
                                  
 
p.e.a 
CIb 
 
[ 0.0195, 0.195] 
[-0.0022,0.392] 
 
[ 0.0025, 0.0025] 
[-0.0080, 0.0125] 
 
[ 0.0034,0.0034] 
[ 0.0011,0.0056] 
 
[ 0.0171,  0.0171] 
[-0.0027   0.0359] 
 
(ii) Worst Case         
                                  
 
p.e. 
CI  
 
[-0.358, 0.642] 
[-0.369, 0.654] 
 
[-0.334, 0.667] 
[-0.346, 0.677] 
 
[-0.311,0.689] 
[-0.322,0.700] 
 
[-0.331,  0.669]  
[-0.342   0.681] 
 
(iii) MTSd                  
                                  
 
p.e. 
CI 
 
[0.0195,0.642] 
[0.0026,0.654] 
 
[ 0.0025, 0.667] 
[-0.0057, 0.677] 
 
[ 0.0034,0.689] 
[ 0.0016,0.700] 
 
[ 0.0171,  0.669] 
[ 0.0017   0.681] 
 
(iv) MTS+MIVe       
 
 
p.e. 
CI 
 
[ 0.0654, 0.630] 
[ 0.0412, 0.636] 
 
[ 0.0026, 0.661] 
[-0.0057, 0.667] 
 
[ 0.0059,0.683] 
[ 0.0046,0.691] 
 
[ 0.0773, 0.640]  
[ 0.0390  0.660] 
 
(v) MTS+MIV        
        +ineligiblesf          
 
p.e. 
CI 
 
[ 0.0654, 0.630]  
[ 0.0412  0.636] 
 
[ 0.0026, 0.661] 
[-0.0057, 0.667] 
 
[ 0.0059,0.683] 
[ 0.0046,0.691] 
 
[ 0.0773, 0.640]  
[ 0.0479  0.660] 
 
(vi) MTS-MIV    
       +ineligibles 
       +MTRg          
 
p.e. 
CI 
 
[ 0.0654, 0.630] 
[ 0.0412, 0.636] 
 
[ 0.0026, 0.661] 
[ 0.0000, 0.667] 
 
[ 0.0065,0.683] 
[ 0.0050,0.691] 
 
[ 0.0754, 0.640]  
[ 0.0544  0.660] 
      
 
  Notes: Strictly positive average treatment effects in bold. 
    a.  Bias-corrected point estimates of the bounds  
    b.  90% Imbens-Manski confidence internals (CI) using 1000 pseudosamples 
    c.  ETS denotes Exogenous Treatment Selection  
    d.  MTS denotes Monotone Treatment Selection 
    e.  MIV denotes the income monotone instrument 
    f.  “ineligibles” denotes the ineligibles monotone instrument  
    g.  MTR denotes Monotone Treatment Response 
  
  
Table 2B. Sharp Bounds on the ATE of WIC Under No Classification Error, Gestation Age 
 
                                    Gestation Age 
   
Normal 
(38-42 weeks) 
 
Not Premature 
( ≥ 37 weeks) 
Not Very 
Premature 
( ≥ 33 weeks) 
 
(i) ETSc                  
                                  
 
p.e. 
CI 
 
[-0.0100, -0.0100] 
[-0.0378,  0.0184] 
 
[-0.0188, -0.0188] 
[-0.0364  -0.0006] 
 
[-0.0036, -0.0036] 
[-0.0106,  0.0035] 
 
(ii) Worst Case         
                                  
 
p.e.a 
CIb 
 
[-0.408,0.592] 
[-0.419,0.604] 
 
[-0.362, 0.638] 
[-0.373  0.650] 
 
[-0.323,0.667] 
[-0.334,0.689] 
 
(iii) MTSd                  
                                  
 
p.e. 
CI 
 
[-0.0100, 0.592] 
[-0.0321, 0.604] 
 
[-0.0036, 0.677] 
[-0.0091, 0.689] 
 
[-0.0036, 0.677] 
[-0.0091, 0.689] 
 
(iv) MTS+MIVe       
 
 
p.e. 
CI 
 
[ 0.0899, 0.576] 
[ 0.0119, 0.583] 
 
[ 0.0053,  0.624] 
[-0.0112   0.634] 
 
[ 0.0107, 0.664] 
[-0.0011, 0.675] 
 
(v) MTS+MIV        
        +ineligiblesf          
 
p.e. 
CI 
 
[ 0.0899, 0.576] 
[ 0.0119, 0.583] 
 
[ 0.0053, 0.624] 
[-0.0107  0.634] 
 
[ 0.0107, 0.664] 
[-0.0009, 0.675] 
 
(vi) MTS-MIV    
       +ineligibles 
       +MTRg          
 
p.e. 
CI 
 
[ 0.0951, 0.576] 
[ 0.0285, 0.583] 
 
[ 0.0083, 0.624] 
[ 0.000    0.634] 
 
[ 0.0102, 0.664] 
[ 0.0051, 0.675] 
     
 
 
Notes: Strictly positive average treatment effects in bold. 
         a.  Bias-corrected point estimates of the bounds  
         b.  90% Imbens-Manski confidence internals (CI) using 1000 pseudosamples 
         c.  ETS denotes Exogenous Treatment Selection  
         d.  MTS denotes Monotone Treatment Selection 
         e.  MIV denotes the income monotone instrument 
         f.  “ineligibles” denotes the ineligibles monotone instrument  
         g.  MTR denotes Monotone Treatment Response 
 
  
  
Table 3A. Sharp Bounds on the ATE of WIC, With Classification Errors and Verification 
of a Mixture of Responses at P* = 0.74, Birth Weight 
 
 
   Birth Weight 
   
Normal 
(2500-4000 g.) 
 
Not Low 
( ≥ 2500 g.) 
 
Not Very Low 
( ≥ 1500 g.) 
 
Not Macrosomic 
( ≤ 4000 g.) 
 
(i) ETSc                  
                                  
 
p.e. 
CI 
 
[-0.0759, 0.0592] 
[-0.0912  0.0784] 
 
[-0.0307, 0.0206] 
[-0.0382  0.0299] 
 
[-0.0006, 0.0067] 
[-0.0024  0.0088] 
 
[-0.0452, 0.0386] 
[-0.0583  0.0559] 
 
(ii) Worst Case         
                                  
 
p.e.a 
CIb 
 
[-0.362,  0.690] 
[-0.375   0.701] 
 
[-0.307,  0.713] 
[-0.318   0.725] 
 
[-0.266,  0.737] 
[-0.277   0.748] 
 
[-0.316,  0.717]  
[-0.328   0.728] 
 
(iii) MTSd                  
                                  
 
p.e. 
CI 
 
[-0.0759,  0.690] 
[-0.0912   0.701] 
 
[-0.0307, 0.713] 
[-0.0382  0.725] 
 
[-0.0006,0.737] 
[-0.0024 0.748] 
 
[-0.0452,  0.717] 
[-0.0583   0.728] 
 
(iv) MTS+MIVe       
 
 
p.e. 
CI 
 
[-0.0119,  0.678] 
[-0.0486   0.684] 
 
[-0.0213, 0.709] 
[-0.0257  0.714] 
 
[ 0.0011, 0.731] 
[ 0.0007  0.740] 
 
[ 0.0295,  0.689]  
[-0.0168   0.708] 
 
(v) MTS+MIV        
        +ineligiblesf          
 
p.e. 
CI 
 
[ 0.0176,  0.678] 
[ 0.0095   0.684] 
 
[-0.0124, 0.709] 
[-0.0166  0.714] 
 
[ 0.0011, 0.731] 
[ 0.0007  0.740] 
 
[ 0.0480,  0.689]  
[ 0.0291   0.708] 
 
(vi) MTS-MIV    
       +ineligibles 
       +MTRg          
 
p.e. 
CI 
 
[ 0.0392,  0.678] 
[ 0.0316   0.684] 
 
[ 0.000,  0.709] 
[ 0.000   0.714] 
 
[ 0.0027, 0.731] 
[ 0.0007  0.740] 
 
[ 0.0553,  0.689]  
[ 0.0458   0.708] 
      
 
  Notes: 
  Strictly positive average treatment effects in bold 
    a.  Bias-corrected point estimates of the bounds  
    b.  90% Imbens-Manski confidence internals (CI) using 1000 pseudosamples 
    c.  ETS denotes Exogenous Treatment Selection  
    d.  MTS denotes Monotone Treatment Selection 
    e.  MIV denotes the income monotone instrument 
    f.  “ineligibles” denotes the ineligibles monotone instrument   
    g.  MTR denotes Monotone Treatment Response 
  
  
Table 3B. Sharp Bounds on the ATE of WIC, With Classification Errors and Verification 
of a Mixture of Responses at P* = 0.74, Gestation Age 
 
                                    Gestation Age 
   
Normal 
(38-42 weeks) 
 
Not Premature 
( ≥ 37 weeks) 
Not Very 
Premature 
( ≥ 33 weeks) 
 
(i) ETSc                  
                                  
 
p.e. 
CI 
 
[-0.112,  0.0518] 
[-0.134   0.0768] 
 
[-0.0552, 0.0090] 
[-0.0690  0.0247] 
 
[-0.0113, 0.0041] 
[-0.0166  0.0102] 
 
(ii) Worst Case         
                                  
 
p.e.a 
CIb 
 
[-0.422,  0.641] 
[-0.435   0.653] 
 
[-0.338,  0.687] 
[-0.349   0.698] 
 
[-0.280,  0.726] 
[-0.291   0.737] 
 
(iii) MTSd                  
                                  
 
p.e. 
CI 
 
[-0.112,  0.641] 
[-0.134   0.653] 
 
[-0.0552, 0.687] 
[-0.0690  0.698] 
 
[-0.0113,  0.726] 
[-0.0166   0.737] 
 
(iv) MTS+MIVe       
 
 
p.e. 
CI 
 
[-0.0563,  0.627] 
[-0.0876   0.632] 
 
[-0.0303, 0.675] 
[-0.0487  0.683] 
 
[-0.0022,  0.715] 
[-0.0084   0.725] 
 
(v) MTS+MIV        
        +ineligiblesf          
 
p.e. 
CI 
 
[-0.0563,  0.627] 
[-0.0702   0.632] 
 
[-0.0303, 0.675] 
[-0.0335  0.683] 
 
[-0.0022,  0.715] 
[-0.0061   0.725] 
 
(vi) MTS-MIV    
       +ineligibles 
       +MTRg          
 
p.e. 
CI 
 
[ 0.0269,  0.627] 
[ 0.0133   0.632] 
 
[ 0.0041, 0.675] 
[ 0.0000  0.683] 
 
[ 0.0050,  0.715] 
[ 0.0008   0.725] 
     
 
 
Notes: 
  Strictly positive average treatment effects in bold 
         a.  Bias-corrected point estimates of the bounds  
         b.  90% Imbens-Manski confidence internals (CI) using 1000 pseudosamples 
         c.  ETS denotes Exogenous Treatment Selection  
         d.  MTS denotes Monotone Treatment Selection 
         e.  MIV denotes the income monotone instrument 
         f.  “ineligibles” denotes the ineligibles monotone instrument  
         g.  MTR denotes Monotone Treatment Response 
 
